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UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-VASQUEZ:
HOW MUCH PROCESS IS DUE? MASS
DEPORTATION HEARINGS AND SILENCE
AS A WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL
I. INTRODUCTION
Immigration has been a heated issue in this nation for
nearly its entire history. While the gates were once wide open
for the hungry, tired, poor masses of the rest of the world,
America's need for fewer industrial laborers has slowed the
flow and even modified its composition; today, many immi-
grants are skilled, educated workers rather than disadvan-
taged peasants. Even so, the disadvantaged still come in great
numbers, seeking the promise of our shores that our own an-
cestors themselves sought generations ago. Strangely enough,
despite the historical fact that the ancestors of most Americans
came to this country poor and disadvantaged, strong feelings
exist for excluding more and more aliens and immigrants from
the United States. This anti-foreigner sentiment can be traced
to a struggling economy, higher unemployment, and the fear of
losing jobs to strangers "who will work for nothing."
It is the responsibility of the United States government to
balance America's current capacity to support new citizens
with its tradition of being a bastion for immigration. The high
demand for legitimate immigration slots mandates that we
strictly enforce the provisions of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (INA)' pertaining to deportable aliens.2 Under the
INA, "any alien ... in the United States in violation of [the
INA] or any other law" may be deported.3
On May 3, 1991, Arturo Lopez-Vasquez was deported from
the United States following a mass deportation hearing where
1. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1970 & Supp. 1993).
2. The INA contains 20 provisions relating to deportation. See id.; see also
Denyse Sabagh et al, Deportation, Exclusion, Discretionary Relief, and Waivers, in
IMMIGRATION LAW 337, 344-358 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, 1990) (explaining the
deportation process under the INA).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(B) (1970 & Supp. 1993).
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the Immigration Law Judge (ILJ) accepted group silence and
failure to stand as a waiver of the right to appeal the deporta-
tion order.4 Lopez-Vasquez was arrested on August 28, 1991
when he re-entered the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. §
1326.' After Lopez-Vasquez entered a conditional plea of guilty
in district court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that his earlier deportation hearing was violative of due
process since the mass, silent waiver of his right to appeal was
not knowing and intelligent.6
This Comment will discuss United States v. Lopez-Vasquez,
where the Ninth Circuit held that any mass, silent waiver of
the right to appeal a deportation order impermissibly pre-
sumes acquiescence in the loss of the right to appeal and fails
to overcome the presumption against waiver of that right, thus
violating the alien's due process rights. This Comment will
argue that the Ninth Circuit has unpersuasively and unneces-
sarily expanded sound precedent to ban an administrative
practice it does not agree with, because the court is uneasy
with the practice of conducting mass deportation hearings,
although it continues to allow them under certain circumstanc-
es. This Comment will conclude that a better-and fair-
er-solution would have been to adhere to the standard enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court in traditional cases involving
waiver: judging each case on the totality of the circumstances,




Deportation is the removal of an alien from the United
States pursuant to an "Order to Show Cause."7 Although the
4. United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1993). (The
Immigration Law Judge (ILJ) asked all of the at least 11 aliens present to stand
up if anyone wished to appeal or to reserve the right to appeal, and none of the
aliens stood up.).
5. Id. at 752.
6. Id. at 755.
7. Lynne Mallya, Deportation and Due Process: Does the Immigration and
Naturalization Act or the Fifth Amendment Provide for Full Interpretation of De-
portation and Exclusion Hearings?, 11 LAW & INEQ. J. 181, 184 (1992); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1379-80 (6th ed. 1990) (An order to show cause is a
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alien is removed, no punishment is contemplated or imposed.
Any alien is subject to deportation at any time, and the only
way to avoid the possibility of deportation is to naturalize. The
vast majority of deportation proceedings are brought against
aliens who have entered the country illegally or who have
overstayed a nonimmigrant visa.8
The INA, enacted in 1952, governs entry to and expulsion
from the United States, as well as the rights and duties of
aliens who are in the country.9 The primary responsibility for
administration and enforcement of U.S. immigration laws,
including the INA, belongs to the Attorney General of the
United States." In turn, the Attorney General delegates most
of his immigration duties to the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS)" and the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (EOIR). 2
The INA contains specific requirements for the holding of
immigration hearings, including deportation hearings. 3 Be-
cause a deportation hearing is a purely civil action, the rules
applicable to civil proceedings apply, and the government's
burden of proof is lighter than in criminal proceedings.'4 In
United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod," the Supreme Court
court order to appear and present the court with evidence why the Order should
not be executed.).
8. Joseph Minsky, Introductory Overview of Immigration Law and Practice, in
IMMIGRATION LAW 1, 21 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, 1989).
9. Id. at 14.
10. Id. at 11.
11. Mallya, supra note 7, at 183. The INS Commissioner is appointed by the
President and has authority over all matters delegated to him by the Attorney
General. "The four regional offices of the INS are further subdivided into district
offices. The district offices institute exclusion and deportation hearings." The mem-
bers of the legal staff at each district office are known as general attorneys or
trial attorneys and serve as prosecutors in the immigration court proceedings.
Mallya, supra note 7, at 183.
12. Mallya, supra note 7, at 183. The EOIR is comprised of the ILJs and the
Board of Immigration Appeals. The ILJs hear deportation and exclusion cases. The
Board of Immigration Appeals acts as the appellate authority in deportation and
exclusion hearings and in certain other cases. The Board of Immigration Appeals
has five members who form panels of three to decide appeals. Mallya, supra note
7, at 183.
13. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970 & Supp. 1993); see also Irene Scharf & Chri-
stine Hess, What Process Is Due? Unaccompanied Minor's Right to Deportation
Hearings, 1988 DUKE L.J. 114, 116.
14. United States v. Meza-Soria, 935 F.2d 166, 169 (9th Cir. 1991).
15. 263 U.S. 149 (1923).
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held that a defendant in a civil deportation hearing was not
entitled to the same protections as a criminal defendant, and
allowed negative inferences to be drawn from an alien's si-
lence. 6 Moreover, holding a mass deportation hearing, in it-
self, is not a violation of an alien's right to due process. 7 For
example, the Ninth Circuit has upheld a mass deportation
hearing involving thirty-three aliens. 8 Further, although an
alien's waiver of the right to appeal must be knowing and
intelligent, the waiver does not have to be verbal, nor must it
be discussed with the court. For example, the Ninth Circuit
has upheld a nonverbal waiver conceded in an alien's brief.9
Although deportation proceedings do not require a full
panoply of constitutional safeguards, they must conform to due
process. Under the INA, deportability must be established at a
full and fair hearing for which the alien has had reasonable
opportunity to be present and notice of the charges. ° At the
hearing, the alien is entitled to be represented by counsel,
present evidence, cross examine witnesses, and examine evi-
dence offered by the attorney representing the Justice Depart
ment.2" In addition, federal regulations require the ILJ to ad-
vise an alien of:
his right to representation, at no expense to the govern-
ment,. . . and require him to state then and there whether
he desires representation; advise the respondent of the avail-
ability of free legal services programs... ; [and to] ascertain
that the respondent has received.., a copy of Form 1-618,
Written Notice of Appeal Rights; .... "
Not all aliens who are brought to a deportation hearing
are deported, however. The Attorney General has the discre-
tion to permit an alien to voluntarily depart from the United
States at the alien's own expense in lieu of deportation.23
Moreover, suspension of deportation is available where (1) the
16. Id. at 153-54.
17. United States v. Nicholas-Armenta, 763 F.2d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 1985).
18. Id.
19. Burr v. INS, 350 F.2d 87, 91 (9th Cir. 1965).
20. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (1970 & Supp. 1993); see also Nicholas-Armenta,
763 F.2d at 1090; Scharf & Hess, supra note 13, at 116.
21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2)-(3) (1970 and Supp. 1993).
22. 8 C.F.R. § 242.16 (1994).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e)(1) (1970 & Supp. 1993).
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deportable alien has been physically present in the United
States for at least seven years, during which time he or she
was a person of good moral character, and (2) in the opinion of
the Attorney General, deportation would result in extreme
hardship to the alien, or to the alien's spouse, parent or child
who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully ad-
mitted for permanent residence." Suspension of deportation
provides not only relief from deportation, but also enables the
alien to adjust his or her status to that of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence.
An alien may appeal any ILJ order to the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals (BIA), and from there to the United States
Court of Appeals.26 An alien has ten days from the date of the
deportation hearing to appeal to the BIA, and will not be de-
ported during the pendency of the appeal. However, the Attor-
ney General may have the alien taken into custody, or may
release the alien under bond or conditional parole.2 ' An alien
may waive the right to appeal, but any such waiver must be
considered and intelligent.8 If the alien's waiver of the right
to appeal is not the result of intelligent and considered judg-
ment, the alien is deprived of his right to judicial review in
violation of due process.
29
If an alien who has been deported returns to the United
States without the express permission of the Attorney General,
the alien is subject to prosecution for illegal re-entry in viola-
tion of 8 U.S.C. § 1326."0 This is a criminal statute with crim-
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1970 and Supp. 1993).
25. Id.
26. Noel A. Ferris, Fundamentals of Judicial Review of Deportation and Ex-
clusion Orders, in BASIC IMMIGRATION LAW 1993, at 229 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5176, 1993).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1970 & Supp. 1993).
28. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 840 (1987).
29. Id.
30. the relevant portions of the statute state the following:
(a) [Amny alien who-
(1) has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported, and thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States,
unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the United States or his
application for admission from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General
has expressly consented to such alien's reapplying for admission; or (B) with re-
spect to an alien previously excluded and deported, unless such alien shall estab-
lish that he was not required to obtain such advance consent under this chapter
or any prior Act,
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inal penalties, including imprisonment of up to fifteen years."'
B. Case Analysis
1. The Mendoza-Lopez Standard
The validity of an underlying deportation hearing is critical to
a successful prosecution for illegal re-entry after deportation
under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. In United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 2
the Supreme Court held that where a deportation hearing
effectively eliminates the right of an alien to obtain judicial
review, a collateral challenge to the validity of the underlying
deportation must be permitted if the deportation is to be used
to establish an element of a criminal offense.33 Accordingly,
an alien who does not make an intelligent and considered
waiver of the right to appeal-and thereby is deprived judicial
review-may mount a collateral attack on the prior deportation
hearing when charged under 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
The Ninth Circuit requires that an alien demonstrate prejudice
from a deprivation of the right to judicial review in order to
succeed on the collateral attack. 4 In United States v. Proa-
Tovar,"5 the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, clarified the hold-
ing in Mendoza-Lopez."6 In Proa-Tovar, the government con-
ceded that the alien's waiver of the right to appeal was not
knowing and intelligent. The court held that the alien must be
permitted to mount a collateral attack on his earlier deporta-
tion hearing since he was effectively denied judicial review.
More importantly, the court concluded that the alien must
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (1970 and Supp. 1993).
31. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (1970 and Supp. 1993) (fifteen year imprisonment
results from illegal re-entry by alien after alien had been convicted of aggravated
felony prior to previous deportation). The statute was enacted in 1952 as part of
the INA. The Attorney General is responsible for its administration and enforce-
ment; the Attorney General, however, delegates most of these responsibilities to
the INS and EOIR.
32. 481 U.S. at 828.
33. Id. at 829; see also BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 261 (6th ed. 1990) (A collat-
eral challenge is an attempt to defeat a judicial proceeding, or to deny its force
and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express pur-
pose of attacking it.).
34. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
35. 975 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1992).
36. Id. at 595.
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prove he was prejudiced by this deprivation in order to succeed
on the collateral attack and exclude evidence of his earlier
deportation from his prosecution for illegal re-entry." In
short, while deprivation of judicial review entitles an alien to
make a collateral attack, the alien bears the burden of proving
that he was prejudiced by this deprivation in order to succeed
on the attack.
2. Other Cases of Waiver
Courts have upheld waivers of the right to appeal requir-
ing less procedure than the Ninth Circuit required for the
waiver of that right in Lopez-Vasquez. In United States v.
DeSantiago-Martinez,8 a criminal prosecution, the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld a waiver of the right to appeal even though the
court never engaged the defendant in a colloquy over it. In
United States v. Holland,9 the Eleventh Circuit upheld a
waiver where the transcript of the deportation hearing did not
include any discussion of the alien's rights at the hearing or of
the right to appeal or apply for suspension of deportation.4" In
United States v. Palacios-Martinez,4 the Fifth Circuit held
that a deportation hearing was not fundamentally unfair even
if the court failed to ensure that the alien knew and fully un-
derstood each and every one of his rights under INS regula-
tions.42
C. United States v. Lopez-Vasquez
1. The Facts
On May 3, 1991, Arturo Lopez-Vasquez was given a group
deportation hearing with at least eleven other aliens.43 Each
alien was given Spanish language form I-648A, which ex-
plained the right to appeal the decision of the ILJ.F In addi-
37. Id. ("We are therefore satisfied that the Court has not eliminated prej-
udice from the equation.")
38. 980 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1992).
39. 876 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1989).
40. Id. at 1535.
41. 845 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1988).
42. Id. at 92.
43. United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d 751, 752 (9th Cir. 1993).
44. Id. at 753.
1994] 487
488 BROOK. J. INTL L. [Vol. XX:2
tion, the ILJ addressed the aliens through an interpreter45
and spoke directly with Lopez-Vasquez concerning the charges
against him.46 However, the ILJ did not personally ask Lopez-
Vasquez or any other alien, individually, whether he wanted to
appeal his deportation. Instead, when the subject of the right
to appeal arose, the ILJ addressed the aliens as a group.
47
45. Id. at 752.
46. The total exchange between Lopez-Vasquez and the ILJ follows:
Q: Mr. Lopez, do you want to get the free lawyer?
A: No ....
Q: Mr. Lopez, did you enter without inspection January 9 of this
year? [no answer indicated]
Q: Sir, you are charged with entering the country without inspec-
tion, do you understand the charge? [no answer indicated]
Q: Is this charge true in your case? [no answer indicated]
Q: The second charge of deportability is this drug charge. I want
to ask you on October 2, 1989, were you convicted in Superior Court in
Los Angeles for possession of heroin?
A: Yes.
Q: Well, they have a technical error on this drug charge of de-
portability. This is going to cause great trouble for me until the Immi-
gration Service can become comfortable with it. But I'm going to sustain
only the entry inspection charge in your case. Tell me, sir, have you any-
thing for your defense? [no answer indicated]
Q: What was your first year here?
A: '71.
Q: What family have you here?
A: All of them.
Q: Well, who?
A: My mother, my wife and my kids.
Q: Your mother, and your wife, are they legal? Immigrants? [no
answer indicated]
Q: Why aren't you an immigrant through them?
A: I never arranged to file the papers [inaudible]
Q: Well, did you apply for immigrant status in 1971? [no answer
indicated]
Q: What happened? You just filed the papers and forgot about
them? [no answer indicated] Thank you sir, sit down.
Id. at 752.
47. The exchange over the right to appeal follows:
THE COURT: Please answer together gentlemen, do you all under-
stand the decision in your case?
ANSWER: Yeah!
THE COURT: [If] you accept the decision now, it is final and you
will be deported to Mexico tonight. But you do not have to accept depor-
tation. If you think it is wrong or unjust in your case for any reason,
you can appeal the case to a higher court. Appeal is the legal way of
saying to send the case to the higher court for study and review. Now
all of you have Spanish language form I-648A. Regardless of the [inaudi-
ble] If you do not have a form please stand now. Let the record show
1994] UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-VASQUEZ 489
The ILJ asked anyone who had questions regarding the right
to appeal to stand up. None of the aliens rose. The ILJ then
asked anyone who wished to make an appeal or reserve his
right to appeal to stand up. Once again, none of the aliens
rose. The ILJ accepted the aliens' failure to stand as a waiver
of the right to appeal, and Lopez-Vasquez was deported that
night.
48
On August 28, 1991, Lopez-Vasquez was arrested and
subsequently indicted for re-entry after deportation in violation
of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.41 In a pretrial motion to dismiss, Lopez-
Vasquez asserted that his May 3, 1991 deportation could not
serve as the basis for conviction under the statute, since his
waiver of the right to appeal the deportation was not knowing
and intelligent. ° The United States District Court for the
Southern District of California denied the motion, and Lopez-
Vasquez entered a conditional plea of guilty, preserving his
right to appeal the denial of his pretrial motion.5' Lopez-
Vasquez subsequently appealed the denial of the motion to the
that no one is standing. Gentlemen, this appeal [form] explains about
appeal like I am doing. And [inaudible] to make an appeal that cost [sic]
money, but forget about that if you have no money; you can file the
appeal free of charge. I [will] give you help with the paperwork. Even if
you do not know at this time if you want to appeal, the law says you
can reserve your right to appeal for the next 10 days and think about it.
Gentlemen, if any of you do not now understand about appeal, or if you
have any questions about appeal, please stand now so that I can talk to
you. Let the record show that no one is standing. If any of you want to
appeal your case to a higher court, or if you want to reserve your right
to appeal for 10 days and think about it, please stand so that I can talk
to you about that. Again, let the record reflect that no one is stand-
ing . . . . There's no appeal and so the decision [inaudible] is final. I am
going to give you and the immigration service attorney a copy of the
decision. And I do wish all of you good luck for the future. The hearing
for you is finished.
Id. at 753.
48. Id. at 753.
49. Id. at 752. On August 28, 1991, Lopez-Vasquez approached the operational
Border Patrol checkpoint on Highway 86. He orally declared in English that he
was a citizen of the United States, but was unable to produce any documentation.
He told border patrol agents that his wallet had been stolen in Mexico the day
before. Lopez-Vasquez consented to a search of his bag, and agents found a card
with his name on it. A computer search under his name revealed an extensive
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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit held that Lopez-Vasquez could mount a
collateral attack on his earlier deportation hearing because his
waiver of the right to appeal was not considered or intelligent,
effectively denying him judicial review in violation of due pro-
cess.52 To succeed on such an attack, and have evidence of his
earlier deportation excluded from a prosecution under section
1326, Lopez-Vasquez had to demonstrate prejudice from the
failure to appeal.53 The court remanded the case for consider-
ation of the prejudice issue. Upon an order denying rehearing
en banc, seven justices dissented.54
2. Procedural History
On November 25, 1991, Lopez-Vasquez moved to dismiss
the indictment against him or to grant his motion in limine to
preclude the admission at his trial of evidence of the prior
deportation hearing held on May 3, 1991." Lopez-Vasquez
argued that the indictment should have been dismissed be-
cause the underlying deportation was fundamentally unfair
and therefore could not be used to prove a necessary ele-
ment56 of the illegal re-entry after deportation." The govern-
ment argued that Lopez-Vasquez's deportation hearing com-
ported with due process of law and that no prejudice resulted
from any procedural error. The motion was denied. Lopez-
Vasquez then pled guilty, and preserved his right to appeal the
denial of the motion." He was sentenced to twenty-four
months in prison and three years of supervised release, and
was ordered to pay a special assessment of fifty dollars.5 9 On
April 27, 1992, Lopez-Vasquez gave notice that he intended to
appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss to the United States
52. Id. at 754-55.
53. Id. at 755.
54. The seven dissenters were conservative Reagan and Bush appointees.
Steve Albert, Ninth Circuit Conservatives Furious About En Banc Denial, THE RE-
CORDER, Aug. 11, 1993, at 3.
55. Appellants Excerpt of Record at 4, United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d
751 (9th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-50271).
56. An underlying deportation is necessary for a conviction under 8 U.S.C. §
1326.
57. Appellant's Excerpt of Record at 5.
58. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d at 752.
59. Appellant's Excerpt of Record at 49-52.
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit."
3. The Court's Reasoning
A three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit entertained
Lopez-Vasquez's appeal from the denial of his pretrial motion
to dismiss. After establishing that mixed questions of law and
fact required it to review the claims de novo,6' the court re-
counted the exchange between the ILJ and Lopez-Vasquez
(discussing the charge against Lopez-Vasquez),62 and the ex-
change between the ILJ and the group (discussing appeal).63
The Ninth Circuit panel concluded that Lopez-Vasquez's
due process rights had been violated. Relying on Mendoza-
Lopez as precedent, the court noted that due process requires
that "where the defects in an administrative hearing foreclose
judicial review of that proceeding, an alternative means of
obtaining judicial review must be made available before an
administrative hearing may be used to establish conclusively
an element of a criminal offense."' The court also noted that
Mendoza-Lopez requires that an alien's waiver of the right to
appeal his deportation be intelligent and considered.65 The
panel analyzed the circumstances surrounding the waiver of
the right to appeal and determined that, although Lopez-
Vasquez was provided with a Spanish language form explain-
ing the right to appeal, it did not prove that his waiver was
considered and intelligent. The most it proved was that Lopez-
Vasquez understood what the right to appeal was.66
The Lopez-Vasquez court concluded that a "mass silent
waiver impermissibly 'presumes acquiescence' in the loss of the
right to appeal and fails to overcome the 'presumption against
60. Id. at 54.
61. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d at 752. The panel relied on United States v. Proa-
Tovar, 975 F.2d 592, 594 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc), which in turn cited United
States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1982). Id. McConney established that
where a court applies the law to facts, it should choose the de novo standard
when the concerns of judicial administration favor the appellate court. If the con-
cerns of judicial review favor the district court, the clearly erroneous standard of
review should be applied. McConney, 782 F.2d at 1202.
62. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d at 752.
63. Id. at 753.
64. Id. (citing United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1987)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 754.
19941
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waiver."'67 The court relied on cases in which courts have es-
tablished a presumption against waiver and have placed the
burden of proving waiver on the government and concluded
that the government failed to live up to its heavy burden of
proof when trying to show that an alien surrendered a funda-
mental right.
The dissenters from the denial of rehearing en banc inter-
preted the Mendoza-Lopez holding differently than the per
curiam panel did.6" The dissenters concluded that to launch a
successful collateral attack, an alien was required to prove that
he or she was effectively deprived of the right to direct appeal
and that the administrative proceedings were unfair in some
respect that would have entitled the alien to relief on ap-
peal.69 The dissent agreed with the panel that an alien must
show prejudice to succeed on the collateral attack.70
The dissent distinguished the cases upon which the per
curiam panel relied to establish the propositions that the gov-
ernment had the burden of proving waiver and that courts
should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.
The dissent noted that the right to appeal is a statutory right
not protected by the Constitution,7 and reasoned that the
cases cited by the per curiam panel concerned fundamental
constitutional rights, which are entitled to more protection and
more procedure than statutory rights.72
The dissent charged that the majority used non-controlling
precedent to create a rigid per se rule that all mass silent
waivers violate due process,73 when it should have analyzed
the facts of the case under the "intelligent and considered"
standard. The dissent disagreed with the court's conclusion, by
implication, that an alien must be asked directly and individu-
ally whether or not he wishes to waive his right to appeal a
deportation order. The dissent recognized that "it is not always
(or even usually) impossible for us to judge the character of a
decision not to appeal just because the discussion is expressed
67. Id. at 754-55.
68. Id. at 756.
69. Id. at 757.
70. Id. at 756.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 758.
73. Id. at 759.
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non-verbally."74 Under the facts of the case, the dissent be-
lieved that Lopez-Vasquez, who had been convicted six times
in the past, knew he would not qualify for relief from deporta-
tion, and that he made a knowing and considered decision to
forego appeal, to avoid further detention and wasted time, and
to return home.7"
III. ANALYSIS
In Lopez-Vasquez, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has taken sound Supreme Court precedent
and embellished it with out-of-context authority to arrive at
the conclusion that mass silent waiver of the right to appeal in
a deportation hearing is a per se violation of due process enti-
tling an alien to make a collateral attack on the underlying
deportation hearing when it is to be used to establish an ele-
ment of a criminal offense. The decision in Lopez-Vasquez is
supported neither by precedent nor common sense. A far better
solution in this case would have been for the court to rely on
the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the controlling Mendoza-
Lopez precedent,7" as clarified by Proa-Tovar,77 and apply it
individually in each case. The authorities cited by the per
curiam panel for the propositions that the government has the
burden of proving waiver and that every reasonable presump-
tion against waiver should be indulged were inapplicable as
they relate to fundamental, not statutory, rights. Determining
whether a waiver of the right to appeal was knowing and con-
sidered is an inherently fact sensitive analysis which calls for
reviewing the totality of the circumstances, not for a rigid per
se rule. Thus, the Ninth Circuit should have adopted the Fifth
Circuit's practice of reviewing such waivers under the totality
74. Id. at 761.
75. Id. at 762.
76. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1987). Specifically,
the court stated:
[W]here the defects in an administrative proceeding foreclose judicial re-
view of that proceeding, an alternative means of obtaining judicial review
must be made available before an administrative order may be used to
establish conclusively an element of a criminal offense ... [waiver of the
right to appeal must be "considered and intelligent]."
Id.
77. United States v. Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d 592, 595 (9th Cir. 1992) (prejudice
is not eliminated from the equation).
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of the circumstances of each particular case.
Courts should review each waiver of the right to appeal in
a deportation hearing on its own facts, rather than expand the
carefully deliberated decision in Mendoza-Lopez to identify cer-
tain procedures as per se unconsidered and unintelligent. In
Mendoza-Lopez itself, the Supreme Court stated, "[w]e decline
at this stage to enumerate which procedural errors are so fun-
damental that they may functionally deprive the alien of judi-
cial review. ..."" Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit, by declar-
ing that all mass, silent waivers of the right to appeal are not
considered and intelligent has done what the highest court in
the land refrained from doing: it has started naming specific
procedures which violate an alien's due process rights. Under
the totality of the circumstances approach, a per se rule is not
required because any alien whose waiver of the right to appeal
was not knowing and considered will have the situation ana-
lyzed on its own facts. The end result for an alien who has a
meritorious claim will be the same.
Additionally, there is no reason why electing not to
stand-when specifically asked to stand in response to a ques-
tion-is not an acceptable means for answering that question.
The Supreme Court has permitted inferences to be drawn from
an alien's silence when called upon to speak in a deportation
hearing in contexts not involving waiver of the right to appeal.
In United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod,79 the Supreme
Court noted:
Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive charac-
ter .... Conduct is often capable of several interpretations;
and caution should be exercised in drawing inferences from
it. But there is no rule of law which prohibits officers charged
with the administration of the immigration law from drawing
an inference from the silence of one who is called upon to
speak. Deportation hearings are civil in their nature."
Drawing inferences from the failure to stand when called upon
to do so is not materially different from drawing inferences
from the failure to speak when called upon to do so. Both re-
maining silent and remaining stationary are passive forms of
78. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 839 n.17.
79. 263 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923).
80. Id. at 154.
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conduct.
Moreover, because deportation hearings are purely civil,
streamlined proceedings for determining eligibility to remain
in the country,81 aliens are not entitled to the same
protections applicable in criminal proceedings. For that reason,
the Supreme Court has held that an alien may be deprived of
his liberty based on choosing not to speak. 2 The Court re-
quired the alien to assert his rights or potentially forfeit them.
If an alien may forfeit his liberty by remaining silent, it follows
that he may forfeit his liberty by remaining seated. It is not
unreasonable to expect someone who wishes to challenge the
results of an administrative hearing to express that he wishes
to do so when questioned, and it should make no difference
whether the expression is made by speaking or standing. Ad-
mittedly, this does nothing to prove whether such a waiver was
considered and intelligent. Nonetheless, this line of reasoning
demonstrates that the process of mass silent waiver can be a
valid way of waiving rights.
In addition, clear precedent to the contrary has not
stopped the Ninth Circuit from raising the right to appeal to
the constitutional level. The right to appeal is a statutory
right, not a constitutional right."3 Indeed, for nearly a century
after the Supreme Court was established, no appeal as of right
existed in criminal cases. Appeals as of right in criminal cases
were only permitted as of 1899 when Congress enacted a stat-
ute allowing such appeals in capital cases; a general right of
appeal in criminal cases was not created until 1911.' Any
such attempt to raise the right of appeal to the constitutional
level in civil cases must fail in the absence of statutory author-
ity. Certainly, the right to appeal is a right which cannot be
taken away.without due process of law; however, less process
is due than if it were a constitutional right.
The only justification for the Ninth Circuit's reliance on
the Brewer and Barker cases is that the court equated the
right to appeal with a fundamental constitutional right. How-
81. For example, the exclusionary rule does not apply in a deportation hear-
ing. Id.
82. Id. at 149, 154-55.
83. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) (citing McKane v.
Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894)).
84. Id. at 656 n.3.
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ever, the Brewer and Barker cases specifically apply to the
waiver of constitutional rights and should not govern waiver of
the statutory right to appeal. The per curiam panel cites to
these cases without filling in the logical gaps. Perhaps what is
most troubling is the fact that the Supreme Court chose not to
rely on these cases in Mendoza-Lopez, which specifically ad-
dressed waiver of the statutory right to appeal. This directly
indicates that the cases are inapposite.
The Lopez-Vasquez decision has created a startling incon-
sistency between civil and criminal cases within the Ninth
Circuit, and this inconsistency is further evidence that the
underlying reasoning of the decision was flawed. In Burr v.
INS,85 waiver of the right to appeal was permitted in a depor-
tation hearing when conceded in the alien's brief.86 Even
though the alien never discussed waiver with the court, the
court nonetheless held that the waiver was valid. In United
States v. DeSantiago-Martinez,7 although the criminal defen-
dant expressly waived his right to appeal in a negotiated guilty
plea, the district court never engaged the defendant in an
express discussion over this waiver.88 Nevertheless, the court
held that "colloquy on the waiver of the right to appeal is not a
prerequisite to a finding that a waiver is valid; rather, a find-
ing that the waiver is knowing and voluntary is sufficient." 9
Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, criminal defendants-who are
entitled to more constitutional due process safeguards--can
waive their right to appeal without expressly saying so, while
aliens at a civil deportation hearing apparently cannot make a
knowing and considered waiver of the right to appeal unless
they expressly and affirmatively state so at the hearing.
Furthermore, the argument that "mass waiver by silence
made it impossible to determine whether [Lopez-Vasquez]
made a voluntary and intelligent decision [to waive the right to
appeal]"9" is disingenuous, for a court can never get into
another's mind. Rather, courts draw arbitrary lines and de-
termine how much process will satisfy a finding that a waiver
85. 350 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1965).
86. Id. at 91.
87. 980 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1992).
88. Id. at 582-83.
89. Id. at 583.
90. United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1993).
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was intelligent and considered. 9' The Ninth Circuit has decid-
ed to draw its own line far to the left of everyone
else's-including the Supreme Court's-when mass silent waiv-
er of the right to appeal in a deportation hearing is involved.
The only problem with the Ninth Circuit's approach is that
there is no authority for such an expansion of deportation law;
in fact, all existing precedent points to the use of the more
flexible knowing and considered standard.
Other circuits interpreting Mendoza-Lopez have upheld
more procedurally deficient waivers of the right to appeal than
occurred in Lopez-Vasquez because an alien must show funda-
mental unfairness in addition to deprivation of judicial review
in order to mount a collateral attack.92 In United States v.
Holland, the Eleventh Circuit held that an alien was not de-
nied due process when he waived his right to appeal, even
though the hearing transcript did not indicate that there had
been any discussion of the alien's right to appeal.9 3 In United
States v. Palacios-Martinez, the Fifth Circuit held that an
alien's due process rights were not violated, even though it was
unclear from the record whether he knew and fully understood
his right to appeal before he waived it.94 The holdings in both
these cases were predicated on a different interpretation of
Mendoza-Lopez: these circuits also require a showing of funda-
mental unfairness before allowing the alien to mount a collat-
eral attack. In both cases, the court held that the proceedings
were not fundamentally unfair, even though the aliens claimed
their waivers of the right to appeal were not knowing and
considered, since the hearings indicated that the aliens were at
least informed of the right to appeal their deportation orders.
The Ninth Circuit has correctly interpreted Mendoza-Lopez
to mean that a collateral attack must be permitted where the
deportation hearing effectively eliminates the right to judicial
review.9 In contrast, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have
91. See Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical
Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. &
CRWIINOLOGY 1185, 1329 (1989) (prohibition of waivers of counsel would provide
greater assurance than the current practice that any eventual waiver was truly
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary).
92. See United States v. Holland, 876 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1989); Unit-
ed States v. Palacios-Martinez, 845 F.2d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 1988).
93. Holland, 876 F.2d at 1537.
94. Palacios-Martinez, 845 F.2d at 92.
95. Noble F. Allen, Note, Habeas Corpus and Immigration: Important Issues
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made it more difficult for an alien to succeed on a collateral
attack by requiring a showing of fundamental unfairness in
addition to showings that the waiver was not intelligent and
considered, and that the alien was prejudiced by the denial of
the right to appeal.9" This test is stricter than the one enunci-
ated in Mendoza-Lopez and has the practical effect of creating
a presumption in favor of the government, since the courts al-
most never find that a deportation hearing was fundamentally
unfair. As a result, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits seldom
reach beyond fundamental unfairness to determine whether
the waiver was knowing and considered or whether the alien
was prejudiced by denial of the right to appeal. The Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of Mendoza-Lopez is clearly better,
since a collateral attack should be allowed when the defects in
an administrative hearing foreclose judicial review of that
hearing.
Arguably, a mass silent waiver of the right to appeal ap-
proaches the outer limits on the question of whether a waiver
of the right to appeal is knowing and intelligent. There may
certainly be situations where such a silent waiver is not know-
ing and considered. For example, an alien may not comprehend
the proceedings, or an alien may be too scared, frightened, or
traumatized by the entire process to respond. Permitting mass
silent waivers does create some risk that such inaction could
be confused with a valid waiver. However, the risk of such a
result does not necessitate the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that
anything short of an express statement waiving the right to
appeal is violative of due process. Logically, all it requires is
that courts examine each case-and its specific set of
facts-individually.97
While, on the surface, Lopez-Vasquez concerns the INS's
and Developments, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 503 (1990).
96. See Holland, 876 F.2d at 1536, 1537; United States v. Encarnacion-Galvez,
964 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 391 (1992).
97. In fact, at Lopez-Vasquez's mass hearing, the ILJ developed a rapport
with the aliens such that one of them presented information which might lead to
his not being deportable; another presented evidence resulting in two-thirds of the
allegations against him being dismissed; and five of them presented enough evi-
dence concerning relatives living in the United States that the ILJ felt constrained
to inquire whether any of those five might have a legal right to remain in the
United States. Consolidated Petitions for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing
En Banc at 12, United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 1993) (No.
92-50271).
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need for efficiency, perhaps the hidden message of the decision
relates to the Ninth Circuit's desire for judicial economy. Ap-
parently, the Ninth Circuit does not agree with the totality of
the circumstances approach, nor does it want to be bothered
with (or have time for) scrutinizing each case of mass silent
waiver on its own facts. However, a court should not sacrifice
justice in favor of per se rules for efficiency's sake.
Additionally, policy considerations do not warrant a per se
rule against mass, silent waiver of the right to appeal in a de-
portation hearing. Certainly, there is a risk of coercion in
group deportation hearings, especially when all the aliens
present remain silent when asked if they wish to assert their
right to appeal. The situation is a difficult one for aliens who
may be unfamiliar with the American legal system, poor, away
from home, and frightened. Furthermore, the Lopez-Vasquez
decision may motivate the INS to be more careful in seeing
that aliens receive due process. However, the court has offered
no support for its theory that aliens will be coerced into not
standing up when asked to assert their rights in a mass depor-
tation hearing. The court merely speculated about the beliefs
aliens have during a mass deportation hearing, but such specu-
lation cannot serve as the basis for such a change in the
law.
98
Just as aliens may be deprived of due process through
mass silent waiver of the right to appeal, aliens may eagerly
and intelligently take advantage of mass silent waiver of the
right to appeal. Sometimes, an alien who knows he or she is
ineligible for relief from deportation and does not wish to re-
main in custody may desire to return home without delay. This
may be accomplished through either an express oral waiver of
the right to appeal or a silent waiver of that right. The fact
that it may be preferable that an alien expressly waive the
right to appeal does not necessitate the conclusion that a mass
silent waiver of the right is per se unconstitutional. The re-
quirement is that a waiver must be considered and intelligent,
and each waiver should be judged on its facts.
As a practical matter, the INS is playing with fire by using
the process of mass silent waiver of right to appeal in deporta-
tion hearings. Even when the waivers are legitimately valid,
98. See id. at 11.
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the INS will often face litigation on this fact-sensitive issue.
For the sake of efficiency, the INS should stop relying on mass
silent waivers and instead should individually question each
alien as to whether he or she wishes to exercise his or her
right to appeal. The reduction in litigation and uncertainty will
easily outweigh the extra effort expended.
Nevertheless, the decision of whether to use mass silent
waivers at deportation hearings is an administrative one for
the Attorney General and the INS to make. The fact that a
more desirable and sensible procedure exists does not render
the less desirable procedure a violation of due process. Despite
its inefficiencies, mass silent waiver of the right to appeal in a
deportation hearing should be valid as long as it is knowing
and considered, and review of such a waiver is not foreclosed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because our limited resources are focused on admitting
those immigrants who qualify for admission to the United
States, it necessarily entails rejecting those who do not mea-
sure up to the standards set by Congress. Although deportable
aliens are entitled to due process, favoring them under notions
of fairness only serves to hurt truly qualified and deserving
immigrants.
The Lopez-Vasquez court should have relied on the
Mendoza-Lopez standard, which requires that a waiver of the
right to appeal must be intelligent and considered, and that
where the defects in an administrative proceeding foreclose
judicial review of that proceeding, an alternative means of
obtaining judicial review must be made available before that
proceeding may be used to conclusively establish an element of
a criminal offense.99 The court also should have followed the
Fifth Circuit's lead and analyzed the waiver of the right to
appeal under the totality of the circumstances approach. The
right to appeal is a statutory right. and deportation hearings
are civil in nature, so this standard ensures adequate protec-
tion of this right.
The Ninth Circuit relied on the proper interpretation of
Mendoza-Lopez, but it unnecessarily and unjustifiably expand-
99. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 839-40 (1987).
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ed the precedent. It cited constitutional law to justify the impo-
sition of a per se rule against mass silent waiver of the right to
appeal. However, the cases upon which the court relied were
not authoritative in the case of waiver of the non-fundamental,
statutory right to appeal. By contrast, combining the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of Mendoza-Lopez with the Fifth
Circuit's totality of the circumstances approach is the most
accurate way of applying Mendoza-Lopez in light of the Su-
preme Court's disinclination to name specific offenses which
per se violate due process. It does not make a presumption in
favor of the alien, as the Ninth Circuit has done in Lopez-
Vasquez, nor does it make a presumption in favor of the gov-
ernment, as the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have done.'00
The standard proposed by this Comment puts each side to its
proof, as the Supreme Court clearly intended. Anything less,
whether in the name of administrative or judicial economy, is
unwarranted.
Frederic J. Giordano
100. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits read Mendoza-Lopez to require a showing
of fundamental unfairness to the alien in addition to the Ninth Circuit's require-
ments. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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